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The paper explores public administration development in 
México within two fields: the career civil service and the 
anticorruption policy. The differentiation between the in-
stitutional arrangements based on the classic formula of 
exclusive competences of each level of government and 
that of concurrent competences, more akin to modern fed-
eralism, has been used in the analysis. A qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of the institutional framework of the 
career civil service, at both the federal and subnational lev-
els, sheds light on the predominance of patronage. This 
situation is dysfunctional with respect to the structure, ob-
jectives, and functionality of the National Anticorruption 
System. Finally, it is pointed out that México needs a new 
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institutional structure in the career civil service based on 
a formula of shared competences, given that the absence 
or extreme weakness of public administration could hinder 
the efficacy of new institutional arrangements for combat-
ing corruption.
Keywords: career civil service, Mexican public administra-
tion, corruption, federalism, institutions, spoils system.
1. Introduction
In 2016, a series of constitutional and legislative reforms aimed at creat-
ing the National Anticorruption System (Sistema Nacional Anticorrup-
ción, SNA) were adopted in Mexico. It was the result of an intense par-
ticipation of civil society in the fight against the greatest scourge affecting 
the development of Mexican society. This is a remarkable effort towards 
the establishment of new institutions for combating corruption at the na-
tional and subnational levels. However, this measure is but a first step, as 
it is necessary to recognize that corruption is a complex, multidimensional 
problem with deep socio-cultural, political, and institutional roots. In the 
sphere of the state, this problem involves crucial aspects related to the 
distribution of powers among the different levels of government in the 
Mexican federal system.
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the limits imposed by the 
emergence of the SNA within the framework of a public administration 
with low levels of professionalism, mainly in local and subnational govern-
ments set in the context of interests and practices of the spoils system and 
bureaucratic patrimonialism.
This research project focuses on the degree of structural and functional 
alignment between the career civil service and the newly created insti-
tutions for combating corruption within the framework of bureaucratic 
patrimonialism and the system of distribution of powers in the Mexican 
federal system. In order to shed light on this issue, a review of the most 
relevant academic literature on the subject was carried out, together with 
a quantitative and qualitative analysis of México’s institutional framework.
The first part of the paper consists of a theoretical overview of administra-
tive development and patronage, with an emphasis on the emergence of 
civil service institutional framework. The second section analyzes the pro-
cess of institutionalization of the civil service in México’s public adminis-
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tration, with special emphasis on institutional frameworks, mainly at the 
subnational level. The final section examines the system of responsibilities 
applying to the National Anticorruption System, the differences of the 
civil service within the framework of Mexican federalism, and contains an 
analysis of key components of the institutional capacity building.
2. Patrimonialism and Bureaucratic Development 
in Mexico
2.1. Corruption and the Institutional Structure of the State
Corruption of the bureaucratic apparatus is an inevitable aspect of gov-
ernment intervention in the economy, since bureaucratic power makes it 
possible to obtain income or profit through corruption. That is why mem-
bers of society find the incentives to place themselves within bureaucratic 
organizations of the state while lacking necessary personal or professional 
capacities and credentials (Ehrlich & Lui Francis, 1999). According to 
Bennet and Estrin (2006), the degree of corruptibility of a bureaucracy 
depends on three main factors: 1) the level of domestic welfare, 2) the 
inefficiency of the tax system, and 3) the institutional structure. We are 
most interested in highlighting the third factor.
As Gerring and Thacker have pointed out (2004), one of the angles of 
analysis least explored in this field is the relationship between the differ-
ent organizational levels of the state’s political institutions. A centralized 
political system with few veto mechanisms and a more hierarchical insti-
tutional arrangement is more prone to corruption, while a decentralized 
political system with greater balance in territorial distribution of power 
could show greater resistance to corruption. Both political and admin-
istrative decentralization are important in order to improve the control 
and accountability in government, mainly at the local level. However, em-
pirical evidence on the subject is often contradictory (Freille, Haque & 
Kneller, 2008). This suggests that no state institutional structure is better 
per se compared to another, but rather that its efficacy will depend on 
socio-political and cultural conditions, as well as on the level of develop-
ment of each country.
A unitary state is a political system in which the central government exer-
cises sovereignty over all the territorial units of the state. A federal state, 
however, is characterized by the greater or lesser distribution of respon-
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sibilities among national and regional governments, with a varying de-
gree of autonomy (Gerring & Thacker, 2004). This means that federalism 
provides a formula for distributing power among federal and subnational 
units (Weingast, 1995), thus allowing, to a greater or lesser extent, the 
preservation of political balance in the geographical, economic, social, 
and political spheres.
For academics such as Rose-Ackerman (2005), fight against corruption 
and non-transparency requires a number of institutional changes, espe-
cially the reform of administrative organizations. The education of civil 
servants for the design, formulation, and evaluation of public policies is 
particularly relevant. It is also important to introduce a merit-based sys-
tem of selection and recruitment of civil servants. A central element of 
accountability and control of corruption in public administration is the 
existence of a genuine civil service career. Another essential reform is 
the introduction of open and participatory procedures. This means that 
there is a pressing need for the creation of public spaces more conducive 
to social and citizen participation, which would make necessary to take 
into account the opinion and resources of society as a relevant input in 
the control, accountability, and anticorruption policies (Rose-Ackerman, 
2005). Thus, it is clear that there is a functional and structural pairing of 
accountability, fight against corruption, and the processes of institution-
alization of the career civil service.
2.2. Political Patronage and the Career Civil Service 
The debate on merit – as a key element of the career civil service – and po-
litical appointments to administrative positions within the modern state 
(Christensen, 2004) rests on the dichotomy between politics and admin-
istration, or rather between merit and political appointments. Far from 
having been bridged, the debate has taken on new force in the past few 
decades even in industrialized countries.
There has always existed a varying degree of structural and functional re-
lationship between political and administrative systems within the institu-
tional workings of the state, and the autonomy of the civil service systems 
with regard to elected officials has been relative. However, it is possible 
to distinguish two tendencies: in the developed countries with consoli-
dated systems of career civil service, there is a process of politicization 
which increases political control, a trend that has been studied by Peters 
and Pierre (2004). In Mexico and Latin America, the situation is quite 
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different because of the phenomenon known as patronage, implying that 
access to administrative – mainly high-ranking – positions is controlled by 
members of a political clique or family, which suggests a degree of admin-
istrative underdevelopment.
In this region, it is difficult to find those predictable and coherent public 
administrations akin to the Weberian ideal. It seems that Weber confused 
his followers by insisting that the bureaucracy would wipe out all preced-
ing social formations (Evans, 1996). Here, different pre-bureaucratic ad-
ministrative organizations subsist in varying degrees in public administra-
tion mainly through bureaucratic neopatrimonialism. 
Bureaucratic patrimonialism has its deepest roots in the spoils system. 
The “spoils system phenomenon is like a ghost. At first sight, it is invisible, 
but is felt to be all-present. It has many faces, but nobody knows exactly 
what it looks like” (Schröter, 2010, p. 141). Perhaps this is why, though 
not uncommon, it remains elusive. It is well known, but ignored at the 
same time. Therefore, it is necessary to explain the relationship between 
patronage and administrative development, particularly the link between 
public positions obtained by appointment and those obtained through 
meritocratic procedures and criteria.
It is important to note the relationship between the concepts of spoils 
system and patronage. The term patronage is used mainly in reference 
to a special form of the political spoils system, characterized by the ex-
change and transfer of resources or public goods between the two main 
actors: the patron and the client. Patronage has a particular character 
because the employer has access to public funds or can take advantage of 
his position while holding public office (Schröter, 2010). The relationship 
is asymmetric in nature and displays relative subordination among actors 
– the ruler or political leader exercises power over citizens who pledge 
their loyalty and political affiliation in exchange for resources, goods, or 
public services offered to them from a public agency by their “employer”.
In México, during the longstanding authoritarian presidency and the rule 
of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, the creation of a career civil ser-
vice was never a priority of the groups in power, given the prevalence of 
the spoils system. The winner of the presidency freely allotted all admin-
istrative positions, mainly of middle and higher ranks (Arellano, 2013). 
However, the establishment of a genuine career civil service is still a pend-
ing task on the country’s political agenda.
México’s political reality reveals a manifest tension between the merito-
cratic system and patronage-based bureaucratic patrimonialism, made all 
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the more clear in the process of introducing a career civil service in the 
federal public administration. At the subnational level there is a predom-
inance of various forms of patronage and bureaucratic patrimonialism, 
since career civil service systems are practically non-existent in state gov-
ernments.
It is important to emphasize the advantages of the meritocratic system 
over bureaucratic patrimonialism. In the normative dimension, it is pre-
sumed that the Weberian systems require the civil service to have an egali-
tarian treatment of citizenry, to provide just and effective implementation 
of the law, and to implement adequate accountability mechanisms. At 
the functional level, civil servants in such a system are more competent 
to perform their duties than those chosen in other ways. Likewise, their 
extensive careers provide the organization with an institutional memory 
that could help improve policy process decision-making (Ramos Larrabu-
ru & Peters, 2013).
Thus, one of the main characteristics in the development of the state bu-
reaucracy is its autonomy from partisan political interference (Du Gay, 
2005). The core question is how to safeguard such autonomy, as a meri-
tocratic element – particularly the career civil service – is one of the most 
effective institutions for this purpose.
There is a clear technical superiority and expertise of career civil servants. 
However, there are also stances identified with the right of the winning 
political parties to design and implement policies and programs in accord-
ance with their political-electoral offer, which need the backing of people 
who hold key positions in public administration and are committed to 
their government programs (Ramos Larraburu & Peters, 2013). 
According to Grindle (2012), public administrations in many countries 
– mainly in developing nations – are based on political patronage sys-
tems, which means that the main access route to non-elective positions 
in government for most civil servants is discretionary appointment for ei-
ther personal or political purposes. Recruitment and public careers are 
controlled from the top, through hierarchical and vertical systems, since 
the contract between the employer and the employee is based on parti-
san political values, such as loyalty, personal interest or reciprocity, rather 
than on constitutive principles of a modern public administration, such 
as merit, experience or professional training. For Schuster (2016) it is 
necessary to remove patronage from decisions about public personnel, 
including the appointment, remuneration, promotion, and dismissal or 
removal of civil servants, regardless whether that is supported by a law or 
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practice within a particular political culture. In this line of argument, both 
formal and informal institutional arrangements constitute the structures 
and rules of the game that harbor the rules and practices associated with 
bureaucratic patronage and patrimonialism. 
Schuster (2016) further claims that a fundamental oversight of the pa-
tronage theory is its tendency to downplay the exogenous political factors 
involved in the design of formal state institutions, which usually happens 
in Latin American countries, including México. In many cases, the same 
constitutions and laws monopolize the patrimonial bureaucracy’s power 
of patronage in the hands of the head of the executive, be it federal or 
subnational. Once formal or informal institutions take over a certain pub-
lic power, as is the case with the executive over its control of patronage 
in the appointment of public officials, the same power has the necessary 
inclination to take over other powers, particularly legislative and judicial 
powers (Schuster, 2016).
Schuster’s (2016) contributions are particularly relevant in the analysis of 
the Mexican case. The institutional design of the career civil service leaves 
the powers of patronage relating to the appointment of the main adminis-
trative staff in the hands of the country’s highest political authority – the 
president of the Republic. Thus, regardless of the political party in control 
of the federal executive branch, the power of patronage remains intact, 
even within the framework of formal institutions established by the law 
(the Law on the Professional Career Service in the Federal Public Admin-
istration (Ley del Servicio Profesional de Carrera en la Administración 
Pública Federal, LSPCAPF). This situation extends to the other hierar-
chical levels of the federal public administration. For example, heads of 
various agencies maintain equal powers because by taking advantage of 
their provisional appointments they can exercise this same power in an ef-
fective manner, incorporating their main staff and political operators. This 
trend only intensified with Felipe Calderón Hinojosa's access to México’s 
presidency (2006-2012) – whose suspicious legality and legitimacy turned 
it into fertile ground for slowing down the advance of the career public 
service – a situation that became consolidated during Enrique Peña Nie-
to's presidency (2012-2018). With the return of the PRI to presidency, 
some of the uses and abuses characteristic of Mexican politics came back 
as well, particularly in the appointment of medium-level and senior offi-
cials in public administration. Perhaps this is the key to understanding the 
relatively failed process of institutionalization of the career civil service at 
both the federal and subnational levels.
572





2.3. The Components of Institutional Capacity Building
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
defines institutional capacity as “organizational, structural and technical 
systems, as well as individual competencies that create and implement 
policies in response to the needs of the public” (2008, p. 92). The World 
Bank points out that the institutional capacity building encompasses 
three main dimensions – skills upgrading (who), procedural improve-
ments (how), and organizational strengthening (what system). Defined 
in this way, institutional capacity building occurs by acquiring resources 
and integrating them in a way that leads to the more efficient and effec-
tive operation of institutions and organizations (European Commission, 
2014, p.3)
According to Bhagavan and Virgin (2004): 
“Institutional capacity thus encompasses, on the one hand, the func-
tions (tasks) that institutions should have the competence (ability) 
to perform, and, on the other, the resources (human, technical and 
financial) and structures they need to that end. For ease of analysis, 
we subsume relations, rules, values, behaviour, etc. within the con-
cept of structure” (p. 3). 
That definition contains a variable number of elements identified as ca-
pacity components that make up the capacity system. “The institution-
al framework that sets the initial boundaries within which the capaci-
ty-building effort can take place. An institution’s framework is made up, 
on the one hand, of formal and explicit rules, regulations, policies, etc., 
and on the other, of informal and implicit norms and values, that govern 
the working of the institution.” (Bhagavan & Virgin, 2004, p. 3). 
A central aspect of institutional capacity in developing countries is capac-
ity building or capacity development. “It generally involves a cluster of 
institutions in either a single sector, or across several sectors. It embraces 
therefore both the micro-institutional approach dictated by the commit-
ment to individual institutions and the macro-institutional one called for 
by a cluster of institutions.” (Bhagavan & Virgin, 2004, p. 2). 
In this approach, the clusters and networks, as well as changes in the 
structures and modalities of interaction between institutions are the focus 
of analysis of capacity development.
By definition, capacity building refers to “a process, rather than a final 
outcome or an output (the results of capacity) which is more easily iden-
tified and quantified. Moreover, building capacity may lead to different 
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degrees or levels of capacity attained” (Greÿling & Auriacombe, 2015, p. 
101).
It is clear that “measurements of capacity building may be qualitative in 
nature and involve a time-frame, since capacity is strengthened over time. 
More importantly, capacity building involves a complex process (…) at 
the individual, institutional and environmental levels” (Greÿling & Auria-
combe, 2015, p. 101).
The concept of capacity building particularly in the field of public admin-
istration includes:
– the development of an impartial and professional administration;
– the development of a training system;
– adequate policy development and policy coordination capacity;
– an effective accountability system, with particular emphasis on the 
system of Internal and External Control (Smeriglio, et al., 2015, p. 
18).
The analysis of the first two components of institutional capacity refers 
to the establishment and operation of the career civil service. The devel-
opment of coordination capacity depends on the federative formula of 
distribution of powers applied in each case: exclusive powers in the career 
civil service, and concurrent authority with regard to the control and fight 
against corruption. With regard to the fourth element, it is clear that the 
institutional dimension, in addition to access to public sector information 
and accountability, includes the system for controlling and fighting cor-
ruption.
This paper covers two essential components for the study of Mexican 
public administration: 1) an analysis of the institutional development of 
the career civil service, and 2) a study of the process of constructing the 
national and local systems for controlling and fighting corruption.
The first part of the analysis covers the administrations of Vicente Fox, 
Felipe Calderón and the first three years of Enrique Peña Nieto’s govern-
ment, with an emphasis on the regulatory and operational modifications 
of the career civil service in the federal public administration. The second 
part covers the last three years of the administration of President Peña 
Nieto (2015-2018), characterized by the intense process of construction 
of institutional arrangements corresponding to the SNA and the respec-
tive local systems in the country’s federal states.
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3.  The Institutionalization of Professional Service in 
the Framework of Bureaucratic Patrimonialism 
Some of the causes behind the tension between political patronage and the 
failed professionalization of México’s public administration can be attribut-
ed to the nature of the country’s political transition. A central feature of this 
process is its high institutional deficit, combined with low levels of demo-
cratic political development. What proved pivotal to the success of political 
transition was the creation of new electoral institutions, which materialized 
with the establishment of the former Federal Electoral Institute, anteced-
ent of the current National Electoral Institute and the Electoral Tribunal 
of Judicial Power of the Federation. Beyond reliable institutions for the 
organization of free and fair elections, the Mexican political transition did 
not generate new ones, not even those necessary for state reform. The cen-
tral objective of transition was the institutionalization of reliable electoral 
systems and processes, not state reform in a broad sense.
This new electoral institution made party alternation possible in various 
areas of México’s political system – federal, state, and municipal. The 
stellar moment arrived with the presidential election of 2000, starring Vi-
cente Fox as the candidate of the National Action Party. Even though 
the institutional deficit remained a major weakness of political transition, 
the presidency of Vicente Fox established two central pieces of the new 
institutional order: The Federal Institute for Access to Public Information 
(Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información Pública, IFAI) and the ca-
reer civil service in federal public administration.
The establishment of the IFAI began with the adoption of the Feder-
al Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information, by means 
of which the institution was founded as a federal public administration 
agency, with operative, budgetary, and decision-making autonomy. In 
2014, an amendment of Article 6 of the federal Constitution designated 
the then IFAI as an autonomous constitutional body, provided with full 
autonomy in the technical, management, and budgetary fields. In 2015, 
with the adoption of the General Act on Transparency and Access to 
Public Information, the IFAI was transformed into the current National 
Institute for Transparency, Access to Information and Personal Data Pro-
tection (Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y 
Protección de Datos Personales, INAI).
The LSPCAPF established the Career Civil Service System (Sistema del 
Servicio Profesional de Carrera, SSPC) in the centralized federal pub-
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lic administration offices. It is important to note that the LSPCAPF, by 
explicitly excluding the parastatal sector, also limited its structural and 
functional efficacy in the federal public administration.
According to the LSPCAPF, the SSPC is a mechanism crafted to ensure 
equal opportunities for access to public service based on merit and com-
prises the following levels: a) general director, b) area director, c) area 
assistant director, d) chief of department, and e) liaison. The SSPC has an 
organizational, functional and operational structure based on seven sub-
systems: 1) planning of human resources; 2) recruitment; 3) professional 
development; 4) training and skill certification; 5) performance assess-
ment; 6) separation and 7) control and evaluation. 
The first Law on the Career Civil Service in the Federal Public Adminis-
tration was abrogated three years later, in September 2007. The first reg-
ulation narrowed down the exceptions to provisional appointments and 
granted the Ministry of Public Administration (Secretaría de la Función 
Pública, SFP) ample powers of control, supervision and evaluation of 
the procedures for admittance into the public service. However, this 
generated a series of disagreements among different groups managing 
different agencies, since this regulatory framework clearly limited their 
decision-making capacity within the SSPC. Article 16 of the first Law 
(2004) prescribed that in the functioning of the SSPC would be coordi-
nated through participation of the SFP and respective agencies. On the 
other hand, Article 19 of the second Law (2007) prescribed that each 
government agency would have control over the operation of the staff in 
the respective subsystems. This was an important change, since it reduced 
the SFP’s decision-making and operational power, while broadening the 
agencies’ margin of discretional power by enabling agency heads to ap-
point their respective middle-rank and top officials.
Another relevant change in the regulatory framework of the career civil 
service was in relation to the exceptional character of appointments out-
side the SSPC. Thus, Article 10 of the first Law included as provisional 
career civil servants those appointed in exceptional cases, as those listed 
in Article 34 of the LSPCAPF. The second Law (2007) retained the same 
provision, but reinforced its margin of discretion. Article 92 has stipu-
lated that provisional positions may be held for a period determined by 
the heads of agencies, senior officials or their counterparts. This period 
shall not exceed ten months, with the possibility for the same person to 
be appointed to different positions up to two times within two years. This 
new provision has considerably expanded the discretionary power of top 
officials in federal agencies.
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While the first institutional benchmark in the development of civil service 
rests on the regulatory framework, the second is clearly insufficient, as it 
is the case with the SSPC in México’s public administration. The greatest 
advances in the development of the career civil service occurred in the in-
itial phase from 2004 to 2007. During this period, the registration of pub-
lic posts subject to the SSPC was completed, there were 14,818 public 
competitions, 5,277 (35%) of which were declared void (Martínez, 2009).
According to Klinger and Arellano (2006), a public service career in the 
federal public administration faces eight essential challenges: 1) the main-
tenance of culture of political control by the heads of agencies; 2) the 
need for new administrative culture; 3) the need for a new administrative 
and political balance in the SSPC implementation process; 4) the need for 
constant watch over the SSPC; 5) persistence of an authoritarian political 
culture; 6) persistence of corruption as part of political culture; 7) the 
risks associated with confrontation between the executive and legislative 
branches; 8) the limited scope of the law, i.e. exclusion of its implemen-
tation on personnel of numerous entities, agencies, and administrative 
departments and sectors. 
The culture of political control based on a very complex administrative 
formalism needs to be changed (Klingner & Arellano, 2006). This re-
quires support from the head of the executive branch and heads of dif-
ferent agencies, as these senior officials, seeing the threat the LSPCAPF 
posed to their ability to maneuver, have hindered the development of the 
SSPC because they seek to maintain control over their respective agen-
cies at all costs. 
México is in need of a new administrative culture that clearly distinguish-
es between the politically appointed officials and the high-ranking civil 
servants who are part of the SSPC. The spoils system is deeply rooted in 
México’s public administration. Political officials tend to preserve their 
spheres of influence mainly by exercising their power to appoint their sup-
porters to the SSPC strategic administrative positions. Some politically 
appointed personnel pretend to implement the civil service, while in truth 
they seek to maintain their personal and legal authority intact within a 
traditional hierarchical culture (Klingner and Arellano, 2006).
Thus, the design of a professional civil service system that yields the man-
agement and governance of the system to political groups and elected of-
ficials is Kafkaesque – the very institution created to control and limit the 
political influence is put in the hands of the cliques, and the spoils system 
still dominates in the Mexican public administration (Arellano, 2013).
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One of the factors that have led to the relative failure of career civil service 
in the federal public administration is the lack of adequate institutional 
arrangements for implementing the SSPC, including its lack of autonomy 
and adequate participation of non-governmental actors – academic in-
stitutions and civil society organizations – particularly in areas related to 
fighting corruption or promoting social development.
The career civil service has not managed to consolidate itself beyond the 
mere regulatory framework. The efficacy of admission procedures to the 
SSPC has been questioned for two main reasons. First, ever since the 
SSPC’s establishment it has been suspected that exams are provided 
clandestinely to favored candidates (a practice made possible because of 
inefficient surveillance or complicity of the internal control unit of each 
agency and the SFP). Secondly, the abuse – also routinely practiced since 
the SSPC’s establishment, though by nature exceptional – of temporary 
appointments (Méndez, 2010). The SSPC has been hampered by the lack 
of commitment to consolidation of the public service that places merit 
(instead of partisan, personal, or group loyalty) as the final criterion for 
access to federal public service (Cejudo, 2012). 
The practice continued during the presidency of Enrique Peña Nieto 
(2012-2018) with the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (Secretaría 
de Hacienda y Crédito Público, SHCP) as the main example. The total 
number of temporary appointments during the first three years of Felipe 
Calderón’s presidency was 376, while in the first three years of Peña Nie-
to’s mandate the total was 379 appointments. The abuse of temporary ap-
pointments has reached such a degree that the temporary appointments in 
the Ministry of the Interior (Secretaría de Gobernación, SEGOB) range 
from the level of liaison to director general. In the first part of Calderón’s 
presidency (2006-2009), there were 43 temporary appointments in 2007, 
199 in 2008, and 298 in 2009 (416 in total). During the first half of Peña 
Nieto’s administration, there were 288 appointments in 2013, 734 in 
2014, and 391 in 2015, totaling 1,413 temporary posts (SEGOB, 2016).
Although the number of temporary appointments within the SHCP re-
mains even, there is an exponential growth of 340% in the SEGOB, indi-
cating a growing capture syndrome of the incipient career public service 
during the Peña Nieto’s presidency. This means that mid-ranking and top 
management in public administration continue to be part of the spoils 
system supported by the ruling political party or the winning candidate 
to the country’s presidency. This could explain the compliant hush of the 
main political forces, in patient wait of the latter’s arrival to presidential 
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power, and with it the opportunity to place his or her political cadres in 
the main administrative positions.
One of the main limitations of the institutional scaffolding of the career civ-
il service in federal public administration is the lack of a genuinely federalist 
approach, despite the fact that the LSPCAPF pompously calls it “Profes-
sional Career Service System”. The foregoing is questionable because of its 
functional and structural failures within the centralized administration, and 
because of its limited scope which leaves out large administrative sectors.
4.  Progress of the Career Civil Service in México 
(2003-2015)
4.1.  The Civil Service Development Index (CSDI)
The civil service is conceived as a management system for public employ-
ment and human resources assigned to public organizations. It incorpo-
rates a series of specific institutional arrangements, comprising a more or 
less articulated set of rules (both written and informal), structures, cultur-
al guidelines, policies, processes, practices, and actions (Longo, 2002). 
The CSDI’s analytical framework has been put together by various re-
searchers specialized in Latin American public administration, as the pio-
neering work of Longo (2002), and of Longo and Iacoviello (2010; 2013) 
confirms. The CSDI includes the study of civil service systems, based on 
variables such as efficiency, merit, structural consistency, functional ca-
pacity, and integrating capacity, as detailed in Table 1.








Efficiency Evaluates the degree of investment 
in human capital within the public 
service, as well as its congruence 
with fiscal policy and markets.
Merit Evaluates the degree to which the 
civil service incorporates the guar-
antees on the use of criteria and 
practices of professionalism in its 
policies and programs.
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Evaluates the solidity and system-
ic integration of civil service.
Strategic 
coherence
Evaluates the linking 
of civil service man-






Evaluates the degree 
of development of the 
managing role and its 





Evaluates the degree of 
interrelation between 
various subsystems re-




Assesses the ability of the civil 
service to effectively influence the 
behavior of public employees.
Compe-
tency
Assesses the ability of 
the civil service to en-
sure the development 
of capacities, skills and 




Assesses the degree 
to which the manage-
ment of a civil service 
promotes effective per-
formance, learning and 
quality service.
Flexibility Assesses the degree to 
which the civil service 
incorporates practices 
and guidelines that 
enable adjustment to 






Assesses the efficacy of the civil 
service from the harmonization of 
expectations and interests of dif-
ferent actors and pressure groups.
Source: Prepared by the author based on information supplied by Longo and Iacoviello 
(2013).
Out of the five components of CSDI, the merit index allows assessing the 
degree of interference by partisan or group political interests in the career 
civil service. This means that merit should be the fundamental support of 
this system in countries such as México, where a strong spoils system and 
patrimonial culture predominate in public organizations. Since merit is vi-
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olated by different political actors (political parties, groups, unions, elect-
ed officials, etc.), the career civil service becomes only a formal institution 
lacking real operational and structural efficiency within public administra-
tion. When a career civil service system lacks appropriate mechanisms of 
guaranteeing merit in recruitment and retaining procedures, it becomes 
an easy prey, captured by the political interests of groups competing for 
power at different government levels. 
4.2. CSDI in the Mexican Public Administration
One of the greatest shortcomings of the Mexican political transition is 
the slow institutional consolidation at various levels of government even 
during alternation of the presidency, with the governments formed by the 
National Action Party, except in matters of access to public information 
and the career civil service in the federal public administration.
Since the LSPCAPF was adopted, the development of the career civil 
service began in many sectors of the federal public administration. Some 
sectors at the federal level had already implemented their respective ca-
reer systems, as was the case with the Mexican Foreign Service, whose 
inception dates back to 1934. 
The evolution of Mexican career civil service is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Civil Service Development Index in México 
INDEX 2004 2013 Variation
Efficiency  35 40 5
Merit 47 40 -7
Structural consistency  45 40 -5
Functional capacity  40 39 -1
Integrative capacity  40 45 5
Civil Service Development Index (CSDI) 41 41 0
Source: Author, adapted from Strazza (2014).
With the adoption of the LSPCAPF and its secondary legislation, the 
CSDI reached 41 points (on a scale of 1 to 100) in 2004. The CSDI re-
mained practically unchanged for almost a decade. Moreover, out of five 
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indexes that make up the CSDI, only Efficiency and Integrative Capacity 
show a positive evolution, rising from 35 to 40 points and from 40 to 45 
respectively. All of the other indexes show a negative trend, with the Mer-
it and Structural Consistency indexes being particularly critical. There is 
a drop of 7 and 5 points respectively. The negative trend is caused by the 
lack of transparency and credibility in the selection and recruitment pro-
cesses, and by the abuse of temporary appointments.
The career civil service in the federal public administration has not been 
institutionally consolidated due to the mentioned structural and function-
al weaknesses. It has been captures by political parties, even during peri-
ods of political alternation in the presidency.
4.3.  The Big Pending Issue: Professionalization in the State 
and Municipal Public Administration
One of the greatest limitations in analyzing the degree of progress in ad-
ministrative development at the state level is the absence of disaggregated 
CSDI index. Lack of specific legislation in numerous states proves the 
predominance of patrimonialism and political patronage in a wide array 
of state governments, with some exceptions.
The situation is even worse in municipalities because of their chronic ad-
ministrative and institutional underdevelopment, but also because many 
municipal governments are undergoing serious governance crises. Crises 
are mainly caused by problems of insecurity and by direct and indirect 
control that various criminal groups linked to drug trafficking and oth-
er illicit activities exercise over local governments, either by coercion or 
financial, political and electoral co-optation of the various local political 
actors – political candidates, civil servants and political organizations, in-
cluding the political parties.
A central element in analyzing the degree of institutionalization of the 
career civil service at the subnational levels is the existence – or lack – of a 
specific legal framework. The differentiation between laws and regulations 
is rather important because regulation by law (as in Mexico City, Zacate-
cas, Veracruz and Guanajuato) brings on a greater degree of generaliza-
tion and enforceability in the processes of institutionalization. The above 
shows that the process of civil service institutionalization mainly in the 
mid and upper tiers of state and municipal public administrations is at an 
initial stage, with low levels of development. The civil service subnational 
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institutional framework exists in only three of the 32 states, but there is 
lacking evidence of implementation of the career service legislation.
This marked institutional deficit in public service institutional consolida-
tion at the subnational level is caused by the lack of integration of the 
national system in this area, stemming from the fact that public service 
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of subnational governments, with the 
exception of public security, electoral administration or access to public 
information.
Thus, at the state level the professionalization of civil servants in the field 
of public security is the area that has received most attention because 
of the serious problem of crime and insecurity that has affected various 
regions of the country for more than a decade. This situation is corrobo-
rated in Table 3 with data relating to a selection of states.
Table 3. Evolution of the career civil service regulatory framework in states
State Regulation




Legislative Power Regulation on 
Civil Service Careers.
Department, office or unit heads, 
and managers of administrative units, 
from lower ranks to area director.
Institute of Transparency Regula-
tion on Career Civil Service.
Administrative; legal defense of 
information and protection of per-
sonal data. 
Professional Electoral Service Reg-
ulation.
Managerial and technical positions.
Chihua-
hua
State and Municipalities Public Se-
curity Career Civil Service Regula-
tion.
Public Prosecutor’s Office agents 
and experts, and police staff.
Institute for Transparency and Ac-
cess to Public Information; Career 
Civil Service Regulations.
Administrative; legal defense of 




Cuautitlán Texcoco Valley Local 
Conciliation and Arbitration Board 
Career Civil Service Regulation.
Auxiliaries, agreements personnel, 
actuaries and labor technicians.
Police Service Career Regulation. Commissioners, inspectors, officials 
and basic scale.
Sonora Audit and Control Superior Insti-
tute Supervisory Civil Service Ca-
reer Regulation.
Institute administrative units’ man-
agers, officials and staff members.



























Coahuila Attorney General’s Office Career 
Service Regulation.
Public prosecutor, experts and crim-
inal police.
Public Security Career Service Reg-
ulation.
Commissioners, inspectors, public 
officials and basic scale.
Querétaro Police Service Career System Regu-
lation.
Commissioners, inspectors, public 
officials and basic scale.
Attorney General’s Office Career 
Service Regulations.
Prosecutors, experts, and investiga-
tive police.
Source: Prepared by the author based on state regulations data.
Based on provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of the United Mex-
ican States (Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 
CPEUM) and on the National Public Security System’s General Act, the 
highest level of institutional consolidation of professional services at the 
subnational level is characteristic of public security and justice.
Another relevant trend is the emergence of career civil service systems in 
areas reserved for autonomous public bodies, particularly those dealing 
with elections, access to public information and inspection, which is a 
trend likely to increase in future years with the adoption of new institu-
tional arrangements.
5. The Emergence of the SNA and its Institutional 
Decoupling with Civil Service
5.1. The Creation of the SNA’s Institutional Framework 
(2015-2018)
The creation of the SNA’s institutional framework can be understood in 
the context of two trends regarding the distribution of competences with-
in the Mexican federal system:
1) Exclusive competences of various governments are increasingly 
reduced since the number of shared competences has substantially in-
creased through excessive centralization of legislative competences in the 
Congress of the Union. Although the Mexican federal system rests on the 
original distribution of powers set down in Article 124 of the CPEUM, 
which establishes delegated powers for the federation, while other compe-
tences belong to the states. However, there is a predominance of the fed-
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eral legislative power through the formula of shared competences estab-
lished in Article 73 of the CPEUM, whose implementation has allowed 
the federal government to continuously widen its legislative powers.
2) The new institutional arrangements in electoral processes, ac-
cess to public information, control, accountability and fight against cor-
ruption, emerging through recent constitutional and legislative reforms, 
deepen the cooperative nature of federalism, widen federal government’s 
competences and, thus, intensify this trend. 
Thus, there is a wide variety of formulas for distributing competences 
among the different levels of government, including mechanisms for co-
ordination, collaboration, cooperation, or concurrence. This has given rise 
to a federative system with low levels of integration, where diversity of 
institutional arrangements prevails, as in the case of the civil service and 
the anticorruption system, which have very different institutional arrange-
ments in Mexican federalism.
The establishment of the SNA, initially arising from the pressure exerted 
by various sectors of civil society, culminated in the amendment to Article 
113 of the CPEUM and adoption of the General Law on the National 
Anticorruption System (Ley General del Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción 
– LGSNA). The SNA is an intergovernmental coordination body for au-
diting and control of public funds and for prevention, detection, and pun-
ishment of administrative liabilities and acts of corruption. It is shared 
by all three levels of government. While the career civil service is framed 
in federalism of a traditional nature – through the allocation of exclusive 
responsibilities at each level of government, the SNA is based on cooper-
ation and coordination between the different government levels. 
The effectiveness of the SNA depends on its systemic integration with the 
career civil service at the three levels of government. There is still doubt 
regarding the extent to which it is possible to combat corruption efficient-
ly while there are public governments with low levels of administrative de-
velopment, as is the case in the vast majority of states and municipalities.
5.2. The Construction of a New Institutional Framework in 
Federative Entities
The SNA consists of a) members of the Coordinating Committee, b) the 
Citizen Participation Committee, c) the Steering Committee of the Na-
tional Audit System, and d) the local systems.
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The second transitory article of the LGSNA prescribed a term of one 
year after its entry into force for both the Congress of the Union and 
the 32 state congresses to approve the legislative changes for the estab-
lishment of the institutional arrangement. This constitutional term ended 
on July 19, 2017. With the exception of Chihuahua and Veracruz, which 
approved their respective anticorruption laws outside that term, all the 
other states adopted the constitutional and legislative changes within the 
prescribed deadline. However, the institutional capacity for coordination 
and operation varies from state to state.
The review of four sets of institutional development indicators renders 
possible an analysis and initial evaluation of these formal institutional ar-
rangements. The first set of indicators is related to the main dimensions 
of institutional capacity, including the degree of standardization between 
the mechanisms for integrating the SNA structures and the state systems. 
These indicators are shown in Table 4.




















































































































1. Aguascalientes X X X
2. Baja California X X
3. Baja california Sur X X
4. Campeche X X
5. Colima X X X X
6. Coahuila X X X
7. Ciudad de México X X X
8. Chiapas X X X X
9. Chihuahua X X X
10. Durango X X
11. Jalisco X X X X
12. México X X X X
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13. Hidalgo X X X
14. Nuevo León X X X
15. Morelos X X X
16. Michoacán X X
17. Nayarit X X X X
18. Oaxaca X X
19. Guanajuato X X X X
20. Guerrero X X X X
21. Puebla X X
22. Querétaro X X
23. Quintana Roo X X
24. San Luis Potosí X X X
25. Sinaloa X X X
26. Sonora X X X
27. Tabasco X X
28. Tamaulipas X X
29.Tlaxcala X X X
30. Veracruz X X
31. Yucatán X X
32. Zacatecas X X X X
Total 32 32 12 15
(% of total) 100% 100% 37.5% 46.8%
Source: Prepared by the author based on state regulations data
The indicators referring to the integration of coordinating committees 
and citizen participation committees in the states show an advancement 
of 100%. This contrasts with the indicators referring to the participation 
of the respective state audit and accountability systems, whose institu-
tional structure is found in only 12 states, which represents 37.5% of the 
total. A similar situation can be observed in participation of municipalities 
in the local anticorruption systems in only 15 states, a figure that covers 
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46.8% of the total. The legislation of 17 states does not provide for any 
mechanism for the participation of municipal control and audit bodies. 
Another relevant weakness of subnational institutional arrangements is 
the lack of integration mechanisms for the state audit systems. These exist 
in 20 local systems, which represents 62.5% of the states.
A second set of indicators is related to the development of local institu-
tional capacity, particularly of the structures for coordination between 
the SNA and the state systems, as well as of their operational capacity, 
including the management and budgetary autonomy of these structures 
(Executive Secretariats), as shown in Table 5.



















































































































1. Aguascalientes X X X
2. Baja California X X
3. Baja California Sur X X X
4. Campeche X X X
5. Colima X X
6. Coahuila X X
7. Ciudad de México X X
8. Chiapas X X
9. Chihuahua X X X
10. Durango X X X
11. Jalisco X X X
12. México X X
13. Hidalgo X X X
14. Nuevo León X X X
15. Morelos X X X
16. Michoacán X X X
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17. Nayarit X X
18. Oaxaca X X X
19. Guanajuato X X
20. Guerrero X X
21. Puebla X X
22. Querétaro X X
23. Quintana Roo X X X
24. San Luis Potosí X X
25. Sinaloa X X
26. Sonora X X
27. Tabasco X X X
28. Tamaulipas X X
29.Tlaxcala X X X
30. Veracruz X X
31. Yucatán X X
32. Zacatecas X X
Total 15 32 32
(% of total) 46.8% 100% 100%
Source: Prepared by the author based on state regulations data
The greatest weakness lies in the differentiated development of coordina-
tion mechanisms of the 32 state systems with the SNA. Only 15 state laws 
provide for the powers and responsibilities of the respective subnational 
coordinating committees with regard to their integration into the SNA.
Considering the operational autonomy of local systems, management au-
tonomy is provided for in all 32 states. There are decentralized agencies 
with legal personality and their own assets, as well as technical and man-
agement autonomy. The state laws have also ensured some degree of their 
budgetary autonomy (Executive Secretariats). In Baja California Sur, Du-
rango, Morelos and Oaxaca, the legislation has established an obligation of 
the respective congresses to allocate a sufficient budget to guarantee the 
integral and effective functioning of the Executive Secretariats. The degree 
of financial autonomy in these four states is greater than in the rest.
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Building the institutional capacity of the career civil service, and fighting 
and controlling corruption have followed two radically different paths. In 
the first case, the dominant actors at the central level, who have ben-
efited from bureaucratic patrimonialism, have succeeded in submitting 
the institutional framework to their political interests, based on an old 
federalist formula. In the second case, the resistance has been limited by 
the establishment of new formal institutions based on a more cooperative 
federalism. The political forces represented in the Congress of the Union 
played a key role, providing the constitutional and legal principles and 
determining deadlines for the establishment of subnational institutions, 
based on the SNA.
The analysis of the SNA institutional platform and the career civil service 
in the context of distribution of powers in Mexican federalism reveals im-
portant structural and functional limitations, particularly the persistence 
of the patronage system. This is a serious obstacle to the fight against cor-
ruption, because of low levels of administrative development, especially in 
subnational governments.
The structural framework of the career civil service, being within the ex-
clusive powers of states, has determined a distinct process of the new 
institutional development:
a)  In the federal public administration, the career civil service institu-
tions are characterized by weak consolidation and autonomy with 
respect to the president of the Republic and the heads of various 
public agencies.
b)  In the states and municipalities, the institutionalization of the career 
civil service is non-existent, with the exception of some autonomous 
public agencies with specialized functions, mainly in electoral mat-
ters.
c)  There is no constitutional base of the structural and functional inte-
gration of the career civil service institutional arrangements between 
the federal government and state governments. The lack of a national 
system in this area hinders the coordination and structuring of the 
incipient institutional arrangements.
One of the main limitations of the SNA’s institutional platform is its weak 
structural and functional consistency in conjunction with other institu-
tions of the Mexican federal system. A central issue is its lack of structural 
and functional congruence with the civil service, mainly in subnational 
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and local governments, mainly because of the obsolete architecture of 
Mexican federalism. While a model of concurrent competences is applied 
in anticorruption matters, in career civil service there is a persistence of 
institutional arrangements based on competences exclusive to each level 
of  government. These institutional differences hinder the effective func-
tioning of the SNA.
At the federal level, career civil service has not been consolidated because 
of patronage, which continues even after presidential alternation. The sit-
uation is even more serious at the subnational level, as political transition 
has not preferred the new institutional arrangements. Thus, the spoils sys-
tem and bureaucratic patrimonialism persist in state and municipal public 
administrations.
Recommendations for structural and functional integration of the career 
civil service and the anticorruption institutional arrangements are the fol-
lowing:
a) Establishment of a new institutional framework for the career civil 
service based on the formula of concurrent competences, i.e. through 
a national system of civil service at all three levels of government, 
respecting the autonomy of each level, similar to that in electoral 
matters, access to public information, control and fight against cor-
ruption.
b) Elimination of the spoils system and patronage could encourage pro-
fessionalism, particularly in subnational governments. It is necessary 
to break this vicious circle by introducing new institutional mecha-
nisms. There are three possible ways to achieve this. The first option, 
concentrated on the transfer of decision-making powers from one to 
another level of government does not seem feasible, because it would 
break the sensitive balance of powers. The second option is effective 
citizen participation that could limit these forms of power abuse. The 
third option is the establishment of autonomous public bodies en-
trusted with the strategic state function.
The anticorruption institutional framework is based on the constitutional 
formula of concurrent powers, which has favored the institutionalization 
of the national system and 32 state systems. There has been a significant 
progress in building coordination and operation capacities, and in the 
management and budgetary autonomy of the state institutions. Munici-
pal level is the weakest link in these emerging institutional arrangements. 
An analysis of the career civil service and the anticorruption systems in 
the 32 states shows a) there is a good level of institutional fit between 
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the SNA and the state systems, in legal terms; and b) extremely modest 
progress in the establishment of the career civil service institutional ar-
rangements, because of non-existent national legal frame, resulting in the 
picture of institutional archipelagos with low institutional capacity.
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IN SEARCH OF NEW PARADIGMS IN THE MEXICAN PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION: CIVIL SERVICE AND THE NEW NATIONAL 
ANTICORRUPTION SYSTEM
Summary 
The paper explores public administration development in México within two fields: 
the career civil service and the anticorruption policy. The differentiation between the 
institutional arrangements based on the classic formula of exclusive competences of 
each level of government and that of concurrent competences, more akin to modern 
federalism, has been used in the analysis. A qualitative and quantitative analysis of 
the institutional framework of the career civil service, at both the federal and sub-
national levels, sheds light on the predominance of patronage. This situation is dys-
functional with respect to the structure, objectives, and functionality of the National 
Anticorruption System. Finally, it is pointed out that México needs a new institu-
tional structure in the career civil service based on a formula of shared competences, 
given that the absence or extreme weakness of public administration could hinder the 
efficacy of new institutional arrangements for combating corruption.
Keywords: career civil service, Mexican public administration, corruption, fed-
eralism, institutions, spoils system
U POTRAZI ZA NOVIM PARADIGMAMA U MEKSIČKOJ JAVNOJ 
UPRAVI: PROFESIONALIZAM I NOVI NACIONALNI SUSTAV 
BORBE PROTIV KORUPCIJE
Sažetak
Rad analizira razvoj meksičke javne uprave u okviru dvaju novih polja: karijer-
ne državne službe i antikorupcijske politike. Koristi se razlikovanje institucio-
nalnih aranžmana zasnovanih na klasičnoj formuli o isključivim nadležnostima 
svake razine vlasti i onoj o konkurirajućim nadležnostima, svojstvenoj moder-
nom federalizmu. Kvalitativna i kvantitativna analiza institucionalnog okvira 
karijerne državne službe na razini federacije te na subnacionalnim razinama 
daje uvid u dominantnu praksu patronaže. Takva je situacija disfunkcionalna 
za strukturu, ciljeve i funkcionalnost Nacionalnog antikorupcijskog sustava. 
Na kraju se zaključuje da je u Meksiku potrebna nova institucionalna struktura 
karijerne državne službe zasnovana na formuli o podijeljenim nadležnostima, 
budući da izostanak ili krajnja slabost javne uprave može onemogućiti efikasno 
funkcioniranje novih institucionalnih aranžmana za borbu protiv korupcije. 
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